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Abstract
Violence is key to understanding human interaction and societal development. The
natural state of societal organization is that a subset of the population, capable of
mustering organized large-scale violence, forms an elite coalition that restrains both
violence and coercive appropriation. We highlight key mechanisms underlying such
natural states using insights from the economic literature on conflict and appropria-
tion. Our results show large variations in elite size, appropriation, production levels,
and welfare across natural states due to only minor variations in exogenous model
parameters. Specifically, unproductive societies tend to have a large elite coalition and
a high tax rate. Only when the elite coalition is small (which occurs in societies with
high productivity) but still able to control a sizeable share of production, can societies
prosper in a natural state.
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1 Introduction
Violence is key to understanding human interaction and societal development. A society
that is unable to contain violence will be disrupted and cannot be expected to sustain high
levels of welfare, as is painfully illustrated by the current situation in Somalia, Afghanistan,
or Libya. Violence may deter interaction, exchange, trade, and the benefits of specialization
that come with trade, possibly leading to significant welfare losses (Hirshleifer, 1988;
Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 2002; Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007). Societies cope with this
threat of endemic violence in various ways, intrinsically linked up with, or embedded in,
their economic and political systems. These systems structure the distribution of rents
in order to contain the destructive effects of unconstrained violence on production, the
economy, and society at large. In their seminal study of social and economic development,
North et al. (2009) provide a novel framework to interpret this development of economic
and political systems in light of the imminent problem of violence in human interaction (see
also Seabright, 2010 and Fukuyama, 2011). They advance three social orders that have
developed throughout history to successfully restrain such violence. In this paper we provide
economic intuition for one of these, the ‘limited access order’, which is conventionally
known as the ‘natural state’.
In a natural state there is no government monopoly on the legitimate use of organized
large-scale violence. Instead, a subset of the population has the capacity to muster organized
large-scale violence or, contrarily, to provide protection from such violence. They have the
capacity to do so and they will use this capacity opportunistically (Lane, 1958). We will
refer to this subset of the population as a separate class of ‘violence specialists’. Importantly,
we stress that the nature of violence considered in this paper is of a higher level than
the banditry-type of violence commonly considered in the literature on the economics of
conflict and appropriation (for an overview of this literature, see Garfinkel and Skaperdas,
2007; Konrad, 2009). Organized and large-scale violence comprises the possibility to
assemble small armies of loyal troops or mercenaries. More generally, violence specialists
have the skills to generate and maintain a patronage network of followers that can, in turn,
be used to exert violence – or coercion – on others. This is why we refer to violence as
being both organized and large-scale. A direct implication is that entry and exit of violence
specialists is exceptional. Depending on the specific setting, membership of the class of
violence specialists is by inheritance or by a combination of wealth, standing, and influence.
As such, our model departs from models where agents can switch between production and
(offensive or defensive) violence activities (cf. Usher, 1989; Hirshleifer, 1995; Grossman
and Kim, 1995; Konrad and Skaperdas, 2012). In our model, producing agents have no
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means to engage in organized large-scale violence, and, simultaneously, they have no
means to defend against such violence.
This sharp distinction between violence specialists and producing agents allows us
to focus on the behaviour of violence specialists (as opposed to e.g. Bates et al., 2002)
and its consequences for production and welfare in a natural state. We do so mainly by
following North et al. (2009)’s narrative of the limited access order, in which violence can
be contained by the formation of a coalition of violence specialists (i.e. the elite). Violence
specialists within the elite coalition agree to respect each others’ privileges, power base
and resource base. They use their joint power to collectively extract rents from the rest
of the population, which is what brings the coalition together. Although the coalition
utilizes its coercive power against the rest of society, it restricts violence, both by limiting
violence between elite-members as well as by by limiting their coercive power as compared
to warlords, which is further explained below. The result is a social order with an elite that
exercises its coercive power to extract rents from the society at large in order to stay in
power. Within this elite, violence specialists compete for the distribution of the rents and
they also compete, as a group, with violence specialists outside of the elite coalition (who
choose not to respect privileges of other violence specialists), termed ‘warlords’ here, for
control of society’s rents.1 Violence specialists choose between joining the elite – sustaining
the economic and political system that limits unconstrained violence and coercion – or
becoming a warlord2 and exploiting their violence capacity to extract rents coercively
without constraints.
Having introduced both elites and warlords, we can now be more specific on use of
the concepts of violence and coercion in this paper. Conflict between violence specialists
(i.e. elite vs. warlords and warlords among themselves) is characterized by unconstrained
violence. In their use of coercion against producers, the two types of violence specialists
use violence only as a means for coercion, but the type of coercion differs, reflecting
their differing perspectives on appropriation. Coercion by elites is self-constrained – and
institutionalized to some degree, depending on the maturity of the elite. Elites use coercion
collectively and strategically, optimizing the gains from appropriation while respecting
each others’ privileges and taking into account the effect of appropriation on production
decisions. Coercion by warlords, however, is unconstrained. Warlords use coercion my-
1Note that, different from the literature that compares conflict and development in anarchy with some
form of hierarchy (e.g. Grossman, 2002; Bates et al., 2002), we treat the elite as a composite rather than a
monolithic entity.
2We use the term warlord rather than the more conventional term ‘bandit’ to stress the violence capacities
that we focus on in our model, i.e. organized and large-scale violence based on a patronage network of
followers.
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opically, optimizing appropriative income under the uncertainty of any future options for
appropriation, and knowing that their individual appropriation has a negligible impact on
production decisions.
In light of the above descriptions of natural states, violence, and coercion, we argue
that most historical and contemporaneous societies in the world can be characterized as
natural states, be it the feudal societies of medieval Europe and Japan, or present-day
societies in much of Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. In these natural states, the
violence specialists within the elite coalition each bring into the coalition their political
parties, ethnic groups, patronage networks and associated organizations, thus creating
a commitment to constrain violence (North et al., 2013). The coalition can create and
distribute rents. Rents may be created by way of monopolies, exclusive rights to trade,
subsidies, redistribution of taxes, or privileges to exploit natural resources. Especially in
resource-rich areas the latter is a crucial source of rents, both in historical and present-day
natural states, with the Democratic Republic of Congo forming a clear, recent, example
(Kaiser and Wolters, 2013).
Violence specialists outside of the elite coalition, the warlords, may be the leaders
of organized criminal or illegal networks and drug cartels (e.g. Mexico), guerilla move-
ments (Colombia), revolting militias (Somalia) or the leaders of independent clans or
tribes (Afghanistan). The number of warlords can vary over time. Examples of rapidly
growing numbers of warlords are Liberia in the 1980s, as officers with their soldiers left the
government army and turned predatory (Bates et al., 2002); the Soviet-Union around 1990,
during its disintegration, as violence specialists formerly integrated in the state defence
and security system started to loot enterprises, natural resources and public funds; or
Congo in the 1990s, as various militias, political movements and ethnic groups militarily
competed for power (Bates et al., 2002; Bates, 2008; Kaiser and Wolters, 2013). The
growth of the number of warlords in situations like these has a twofold negative effect on
the economy. First, the ensuing violence destroys lives and capital goods, and deters trade
and investments. Second, warlords do not levy regular taxes but exploit their violence
capacity to appropriate as much production as they can – through looting, extortion etc. –
realizing that future options for appropriation are highly uncertain or may not even exist.
Such appropriation undermines the security of property rights and deters investments,
and this to a greater extent than in a stable society with more predictable monopolies and
privileges of the elite coalition, a situation that does not fully or necessarily stand in the
way of economic growth (North et al., 2013).
Using insights from the economic literature on conflict and appropriation, in which
violence is a central element, we propose a model that allows us to better understand the
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relation between, on the one hand, opportunities and constraints in the use of organized
large-scale violence, and production and distribution of welfare on the other hand. Doing
so, we highlight some of the key mechanisms underlying the natural state; mechanisms
that determine the extent to which violence is contained and how this affects production
and welfare. In a nutshell our model is as follows. Violence specialists either join the
elite or become a warlord. Depending on their relative size, the elite and warlords each
control a share of society, its population, and production. Both elites and warlords use
their violence capacity to appropriate production, but they do so in distinct ways. The elite
resembles a ‘stationary bandit’, by enforcing a tax on production to support their coalition,
taking into account – in the spirit of McGuire and Olson (1996) – that a high tax rate deters
production. This tax rate should be interpreted broadly as encompassing all possible forms
of rent extraction, and the optimal level of rent extraction may be very high, for instance
when the marginal effect of taxation on production is low. Warlords do not levy taxes
but instead they exploit their violence capacity to appropriate as much production as they
can. This advantage of warlords over elite-members in terms of rent extraction is partly
mitigated by cooperation of the elite in the coalition, based on the mutual agreement to
respect each others’ privileges and collectively defend these against warlords. A side-effect,
however, is that such cooperation may result in competition over rent distribution within
the coalition. In response to the expected level of appropriation, producers decide how
much effort to devote to production.3 Since the aggregate rate of appropriation is largely
determined by the number of warlords (in addition to the tax rate), a key outcome of our
paper is the ratio of elites to warlords in equilibrium.
Our three main results are the following. First, we identify conditions under which a
sizeable elite emerges, capable of limiting the activities of warlords. We interpret such a
sizeable coalition as capable of providing order and stability. We find that an elite coalition
of substantial size is feasible only when productivity is low4 or when the elite has strong
benefits to cooperation against warlords, offsetting the natural appropriation advantage of
warlords. Second, we identify how production affects the behaviour of violence specialists
and vice versa. We find that the tax rate levied by the elite coalition decreases with the
productivity of the society. Hence, more productive societies face a lower tax rate from
the elite coalition, but this implies that more violence specialists will choose to become
warlords, increasing the level of appropriation in such productive societies, all of which
results in a situation reminiscent of the resource curse (Mehlum et al., 2006). Jointly, our
3‘Effort’ is a stylized term to capture several mechanisms through which appropriation leads to reduced
production, see also Section 2.3.
4We use the term productivity to refer to the output elasticity of effort, being the only input to the
production function introduced in Section 2.3.
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first two results imply that societies with low productivity are characterized by large elite
coalitions and high tax rates. Such societies gain from order and stability that come with
large coalitions but this comes at the price of high tax rates. This brings us to our third
result on the interrelations of these outcomes with producer welfare in a natural state.
Consistent with our first two results, we find that the benefits of an elite coalition to society
are often limited. Only when the elite coalition is small (which occurs in societies with high
productivity) but still able to control a sizeable share of production, can societies prosper
in a natural state. Summarizing, both productivity and order are necessary conditions for
prosperity. This conclusion advances previous work by e.g. Bates et al. (2002) who stress
the trade-off between ‘production’ and ‘protection’ in stateless societies. In our analysis we
find that this trade-off is mitigated by the incentives of violence specialists and especially
those that join forces in the elite.
In general, we offer additional insights to the mechanisms of the natural state, which
emerged during the Neolithic Revolution, and is the dominant social order in most of
the world still. Adding to North et al. (2009), we find large variations in elite size,
appropriation, production levels, and welfare across natural states due to only minor
variations in exogenous model parameters, such as productivity and the cost of conflict.
This result implies that outcomes may differ substantially across natural states and even
across societies with the same level of ‘maturation’. Surprisingly, we obtain this result
in a model with an institutional setting that does not foster growth (cf. Acemoglu et al.,
2005) and whilst ignoring the impact of human capital (Galor, 2005), the two leading
suggested determinants of economic welfare. Our results differ from those by North et al.
(2009) mainly because we make the incentives to violence specialists explicit. Whereas
North et al. (2009) take it for granted that all violence specialists have an incentive to
join the elite coalition, our model shows that this choice depends on a number of factors,
including differences in appropriation rates between elites and warlords as well as the
behaviour of producers. We emphasize the existence of a substantial number of warlords
as a rather permanent situation, whereas North et al. (2009) interpret warlordism only
as a transitional situation in times of coalition instability. A consequence of accounting
for incentives is that we shift our attention from elite behaviour to violence specialists’
behaviour in general, including implications for elite size, appropriation, production levels,
and welfare.
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2 Model
The salient feature of the natural state as described by North et al. (2009) is the formation
of an elite coalition that restrains the imminent problem of unconstrained violence and
coercion. This focus on violence is central to our model. The success of the elite in
establishing order and stability mainly depends on their capacity to restrain the warlords.
The elites have an incentive to fight off the warlords because these also appropriate part
of the production of society and do not commit to respecting other specialists’ privileges.
Therefore, the more the elites restrain the warlords, the more production they can control
(and tax) themselves. The question is now whether providing order and stability to extract
taxes can be profitable enough to induce violence specialists to refrain from unconstrained
coercive appropriation from producers. We approach this question by analysing the payoffs
to elites and warlords and their interaction with the producing agents.
Our main simplifying assumption is that we consider violence specialists as individuals,
and their capacities as homogeneous. Recall that we consider violence specialists as having
the skills to generate and maintain a patronage network of followers. Our assumption
of violence specialists as homogeneous individuals has three main implications. First,
homogeneity removes any reason to discriminate between violence specialists of the same
occupation. As a result, payoffs are equal across elite-members as well as across warlords.
Second, we can abstract away from the specificities of the formation and size of patronage
networks. Second, we need not explicitly model entry and exit into the elite coalition. In
reality, as a result of competition over the tax rents within the coalition, the composition
of the coalition may be continuously changing, as power relations between members
change, and because members with negligible contributions are weeded out and, potentially,
substituted for new members (see Section 4). With homogeneous violence specialists –
and given that our model allows violence specialists to freely choose whether or not to join
the elite – this process of entry and exit can be ignored and coalitions are characterized by
their size only.
Given this simplification, our model allows us to focus on the violence specialists’ choice
whether or not to join the elite, and its implications for production levels and producer
welfare. This choice depends on the relative profitability of each occupation. As a result,
each equilibrium features a specific distribution of elites and warlords.
Now, consider a natural state with a population of a fixed size, denoted by the set N .
There are two subsets of individuals in this society: violence specialists, denoted by the
set V , and the remainder of population that we refer to as producers, denoted by its
complement P = N \ V . The categories are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive
7
with respect to N , and in our static model there is no mobility between them. Members of
each subset are homogeneous in all relevant aspects.
Violence specialists i ∈ V can appropriate production from the producers in two different
ways, and this appropriation decision is determined by their choice of occupation. Elite-
members cooperate and appropriate by levying a jointly determined tax on their controlled
production, while warlords appropriate by stealing all of their controlled production This
model feature is a stylized representation of the warlords’ uncertain power base which
makes them myopic in their decision on how much to appropriate.5 The two occupations
exert negative externalities, because the amount of production appropriated by warlords
decreases the production available for appropriation by elite-members, and vice versa. As
a result, elite-members and warlords compete over the share of total production either side
controls. From the side of the elite-members, this can be interpreted as either (i) the share
of society whereon they effectively impose order, or (ii) the extent to which they succeed
in establishing order over the entire population.
The occupation choice by violence specialists is the first stage of our model, which
consists of three stages. These are shortly described below and worked out in detail in
Section 3. In addition, In Section 4 we will extend the model with an additional stage
that features conflict within the coalition, a highly relevant model feature in light of the
historical examples cited in the introduction.
2.1 Occupation choice (Stage 1)
Each violence specialist i ∈ V decides to join the elite coalition or not. We denote this
occupation choice by µi ∈ {1,0} ∀i ∈ V . If µi = 1, the specialist joins the elite coalition.
If µi = 0, the specialist becomes a warlord. The outcome of these decisions is a vector
µ = (µi : i ∈ V ) that partitions the violence specialists in two subsets: the elite coalition
E = {i : µi = 1} consisting of e = |E| elite-members, and its complement W = V \ E = {i :
µi = 0} consisting of w = |W | warlords.
Control over producers by elites and warlords is given deterministically by the ratio ew
(see (17) below). We use the following function to determine the share of total production
that is controlled by elites:
ρ(e, w) =
θ em
θ em + wm
, (1)
5 In addition, since warlords operate alone – and given a sufficiently large number of violence specialists –
individual appropriation rates have only negligible impact on production so that myopic behaviour is not an
assumption but an implication from the model introduced below.
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with m ∈ (0,1) and θ ∈ [1,∞). It follows that the share of total production that is
controlled by warlords equals 1−ρ(e, w). A few comments on (1) are appropriate here.
First, its functional form is borrowed from the rent seeking literature (Tullock, 1980).
Our specification of ρ(e, w) is based on a modification of the ratio-form contest success
function (CSF), inspired by the axiomatic characterization of group CSFs by Münster
(2009). Parameter m is conventionally interpreted as the effectiveness of conflict, and
here we interpret it as the effectiveness of group size, where group refers to either the
elite coalition or the aggregate of warlords. Given m< 1, there are diminishing marginal
returns to group formation. Specifically, low m implies that a small elite coalition is capable
of controlling a relatively large share of production. Parameter θ represents a fighting
asymmetry (cf. Usher, 1989; Clark and Riis, 1998) in favour of the elite coalition that we
consider to be better organized than warlords, because of their commitment to respect
each others’ privileges. In the context of North et al. (2009) one could interpret θ as the
cooperative quality, or maturity, of the coalition, with more mature coalitions capable of
organizing and coordinating power more efficiently.6 One implication of this functional
form is that the elite may control a larger share of production, even if it is smaller in size
than the aggregate of warlords.
Second, note that our interpretation of ρ(e, w) is non-probabilistic in the sense that it
represents a share, rather than a winning probability (although the two interpretations are
equivalent under the assumption of risk neutrality). For a detailed discussion of CSFs and
their interpretations, see Hirshleifer (2000), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007), and Konrad
(2009).
Third, although we talk freely about the share of production that is controlled by
warlords, the degree of cooperation by warlords has not been specified yet. North et al.
(2009) are not explicit about cooperative behaviour by warlords, if at all. In the functional
form chosen in (1), warlords do work together, but have a fighting disadvantage compared
with the elite, through θ . The alternative approach is to model warlords as operating alone,
using the term w× 1m rather than wm, which would imply
ρ′(e, w) = θ e
m
θ em + w× 1m =
θ em
θ em + w
. (2)
This alternative specification, however, has two disadvantages: (i) It would give the
coalition a fighting disadvantage for any m< 1, so that the effects of m and θ may cancel
each other out. This disadvantage is reversed for m> 1. In our model set-up, however, if
6See van Bavel et al. (2016) who interpret θ as an indicator of a specific type of organizations in the
natural state.
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θ is sufficiently large, then m> 1 leads to a corner solution where all specialists end up
in the elite coalition.7 This is a standard feature of the ratio-form CSF, discussed in detail
by Hirshleifer (1995) and employed by Skaperdas (1998) to assess coalition formation
in a different setting. (ii) Using ρ′(e, w) to calculate the equilibrium ratio of elites to
warlords, as we do for ρ(e, w) in (14) below, would lead to asymptotic behaviour of this
ratio, including discontinuities and negative outcomes. Both features are undesirable and
we stick to (1).
Fourth and final, our specification of ρ(e, w) deviates from the standard approach in
the economic literature on conflict and appropriation. Most importantly, this contest is
deterministic in the sense that the outcome of the contest depends only on the ratio ew .
Notably, it does not depend on costly investments in violence capacity. That is, in the
Stage 2 contest, elite-members and warlords do not explicitly choose their violence level as is
conventional in models that feature a trade-off between own production and appropriation
(e.g. Hirshleifer, 1988, 1995; Skaperdas, 1992; Grossman and Kim, 1995) or in rent-seeking
models (Nitzan, 1994). We focus, however, on organized large-scale violence and, in our
model, the capacity for such violence is restricted to violence specialists, while production
is the domain of the separate subset of producers. As a result, violence specialists are not
confronted with this trade-off between own production and appropriation. In addition,
motivated by the homogeneity of violence specialists, the only effect of not ignoring costly
investments in violence would be that payoffs of violence specialists would be reduced in
the symmetric outcome of such a model, without any qualitative impacts on model results.
2.2 Tax (Stage 2)
Given the outcome of Stage 1, the elite controls a share ρ(e, w) and warlords jointly control
a share 1−ρ(e, w), which each of them can appropriate as they wish. Following the main
features of the limited access order by North et al. (2009), elite-members collectively
determine their tax rate τ ∈ [0, 1], while warlords, by construction, choose to appropriate
all production under their control.
2.3 Production (Stage 3)
Given the outcome of Stages 1–2, producers decide on their joint production level. We
model production Y by producers with a Von Thünen production function. This function
exhibits diminishing marginal returns to costly effort φ, the only variable input. In a Von
7Specifically, a corner solution results if (1−α)θ ≥ 1, where α is a productivity parameter that is introduced
below in Section 2.3.
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Thünen production function, this effort term is conventionally interpreted as a measure
of the capital-to-labour ratio. As a result, our production function is similar to a linearly
homogeneous Cobb-Douglas production function (Lloyd, 2001), with exponent 1−α for
labour and α for capital, whilst it allows us to focus on effort only:
Y (φ) = βφα. (3)
Parameter α ∈ (0,1) denotes the output elasticity of effort, which, in absence of other
variable inputs, we will refer to as productivity. Parameter β ∈ (0,∞) reflects total factor
productivity. We will refer to β as a technology parameter.
Appropriation by elites and warlords reduces the amount of produce available for
consumption. Producers maximize their utility U which equals aggregate consumption –
production net of appropriation – minus the cost of effort.
U = (1−τ)ρ(e, w)Y (φ)− γφ. (4)
with cost parameter γ ∈ (0,∞).
§
Given our main assumption that violence specialists are homogeneous, payoffs pii are
equal across warlords as well as across elite-members. Incorporating all decisions made in
Stages 2–4, this implies the following payoff functions:
pii =

1
e

τρ(e, w)Y (φ) ∀i ∈ E; (5)
pi j =

1
w
 
1−ρ(e, w)Y (φ) ∀ j ∈W. (6)
The stability concept that we use to evaluate outcomes of the model is a simple equilibrating
mechanism that equates payoffs to elites and warlords. That is, in Stage 1 violence
specialists choose the most profitable occupation. They make this choice whilst taking into
account (i) the optimal tax rate that will be chosen by the elite, and (ii) the optimal response
in terms of production by producers. Hence, in equilibrium, payoffs to elite-members and
warlords are equal. If not, then a profitable switch of occupation could be made by at
least one violence specialist, while taking into account that changing occupations shifts
the balance of power between warlords and the elite coalition with subsequent impacts
on the outcomes of Stages 2–3. This equilibrating mechanism is reminiscent of more
advanced stability concepts applied in alliance models and non-cooperative models of
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coalition formation (cf. Skaperdas, 1998; Yi, 2003; Garfinkel, 2004).
3 Results
In this section we present the results of our model. Solving the model backwards, we
analyse each of the four stages consecutively.
3.1 Production (Stage 3)
Given outcomes of Stages 1–2, producers choose φ to maximize their utility (4):
∂ U
∂ φ
= (1−τ)ρ(e, w)∂ Y (φ)
∂ φ
− γ= 0 (7)
By the production function in (3) we have
∂ Y (φ)
∂ φ
= αβφα−1 (8)
Substituting this derivative into (7) and solving for φ, we obtain:
φ∗ =

(1−τ)ρ(e, w)αβ
γ
 1
1−α
. (9)
Substituting this equilibrium level of effort into (3) and solving for Y , we obtain:
Y ∗ = β

(1−τ)ρ(e, w)αβ
γ
 α
1−α
. (10)
We will further assess Y ∗ in Section 3.4 below.
3.2 Tax (Stage 2)
Given the outcome of Stage 1, the elite coalition chooses the tax rate τ. Since violence
specialists are homogeneous, there is no difference between choosing a tax rate that
maximizes individual payoffs or one that maximizes the payoff to the coalition as a whole.
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Substituting (10) for Y , the coalition payoff piE equals e times individual elite payoff (5):
piE = e

1
e

τρ(e, w)Y (φ)
= τρ(e, w)β

(1−τ)ρ(e, w)αβ
γ
 α
1−α
(11)
We can now maximize and solve for τ to find:
τ∗ = 1−α. (12)
Our first result follows directly.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the optimal tax rate τ∗ decreases linearly in productivity α,
and is independent of β , γ, θ , and m.
Given α < 1, the equilibrium tax rate is strictly smaller than 1. The elite coalition
abstains from fully taxing away its controlled production. When α is low the effect of the
tax rate on production is small and hence, it is optimal to set a high tax rate. The opposite
holds when α is high.
3.3 Occupation choice (Stage 1)
Each violence specialist chooses his occupation µ ∈ {0, 1} to maximize his payoff as given
by (5) and (6), taking into account the effects of occupation choice on payoffs via (1) on
the Stage 2 tax rate and Stage 3 production. Recall our equilibrating mechanism of equal
payoffs to both occupations such that pii = pi for all i ∈ V . Applying this mechanism, we
equate (5) and (6) to find the equilibrium ratio of elites to warlords, which is independent
from production:
e
w
=
τρ(e, w)
1−ρ(e, w) . (13)
By the specification of ρ(e, w) in (1), the size of the elite-controlled production depends
positively on the ratio of elite-members to warlords. Since our economy has a population
of fixed size and does not allow mobility between violence specialists and producers, the
number of violence specialists is also fixed. We have |V | = e+w: an increase in e implies a
decrease in w of equal size and vice versa. We use this model feature and also substitute (1)
for ρ(e, w) in the equilibrium ratio (13). After simplification and substitution of (12) for τ
we obtain the equilibrium ratio of elites to warlords as a function of parameters α, m,
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and θ :
e∗
w∗ =

(1−α)θ 11−m . (14)
By substituting w∗ = |V | − e∗, we also obtain e∗ and w∗ separately:
e∗ =

(1−α)θ 1m−1 + 1−1 |V |, (15)
w∗ =

(1−α)θ 11−m + 1−1 |V |. (16)
The elite-warlord ratio (14) increases with the tax rate. It also increases with m when
(1−α)θ > 1 which implies e∗w∗ > 1. In that case, the elite has an advantage in generating
rents as a combined effect of controlling and taxing production. Given m < 1, profit
per occupation, in both occupations, decreases with the size of the group. Therefore,
equilibrium group size can be interpreted as the relative profitability of an occupation, with
the larger group having an advantage in generating rents.
For the limit case where θ = 1, and since α ∈ (0,1), the elite-warlord ratio is strictly
smaller than 1, approaching unity only in the limit where the tax rate (i.e. 1 − α) ap-
proaches 1. Put differently, in absence of an elite fighting advantage, the number of
elite-members is never larger than the number of warlords. This cap on elite size fol-
lows from our model feature that warlords fully appropriate their controlled production,
whereas elite-members do not necessarily. Hence, elite-members, by construction, have a
disadvantage in terms of their capacity to generate rents, which can be offset only by their
fighting advantage in case θ > 1.
In Figure 1 we plot (15), the equilibrium number of elites e∗, and (14), the equilibrium
elite-warlord ratio, as a function of (1− α)θ for different values of parameter m. This
figure illustrates that the presence of a sizeable elite coalition in a natural state is not trivial.
An (almost) empty elite coalition is possible for low values of (1− α)θ . In contrast, an
elite coalition that contains (nearly) all violence specialists is possible for high values of
(1− α)θ and high m. Note that, by the exponent −11−m in (15) and (16), these are limit
results for θτ going to zero or infinity. Both e∗ and w∗ converge to, but will never reach,
0 or |V |, ruling out any corner solutions.
From (14) follows our next result.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, the elite-warlord ratio e
∗
w∗ is:
(i) decreasing with productivity α;
(ii) independent of the technology-cost ratio βγ ;
(iii) increasing with elite fighting advantage θ ;
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Figure 1: Equilibrium size of the elite coalition e∗ and equilibrium elite-warlord ratio e∗w∗ as
a function of (1−α)θ for |V |= 50, and different values of parameter m.
(iv) decreasing with the effectiveness of group size m if and only if (1−α)θ < 1.
Proof. The results follow directly from the relevant first order conditions to (14).
3.4 Producer welfare (Back to Stage 3)
The negative relation between productivity α and the equilibrium elite-warlord ratio natu-
rally results in the question whether and, if so, under which conditions producers benefit
from the presence of a large elite coalition. Our results show three countervailing effects
with respect to α. First, there is a direct positive effect of α on production (see (8)). Second,
there is an indirect positive effect of α on production via the tax rate (see Proposition 1).
Third, there is an indirect negative effect of α on production via the elite-warlord ratio
(see Proposition 2). We assess this combination of effects on production by evaluating the
equilibrium production level through substitution of the equilibrium elite-warlord ratio
and the equilibrium tax rate. From this equilibrium production level, we can then proceed
to evaluate producer utility (4), our measure of producer welfare.
We first rewrite the CSF in (1) in terms of the elite-warlord ratio by multiplying both
RHS fraction terms with (θ em)−1:
ρ(e, w) =

1+

1
θ
 e
w
−m−1
. (17)
We then proceed to substitute (14) for ew in order to obtain ρ(e
∗, w∗) in equilibrium:
ρ(e∗, w∗) =

1+ (1−α) (1−α)θ 1m−1−1 . (18)
Consistent with Proposition 2, the comparative statics ofρ(e∗, w∗) with respect to exogenous
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parameters α, θ , and m are equivalent to those for the equilibrium ratio of elites to warlords
in (14). That is, ρ(e∗, w∗) is decreasing in α, increasing in θ , and decreasing in m if and
only if (1−α)θ < 1.
Next, we substitute (12) for τ and (18) for ρ(e, w) in the equilibrium production
level (10), to obtain equilibrium production as a function of exogenous parameters only:
Y ∗ = β

α2β
γ
 α
1−α 
1+ (1−α) (1−α)θ 1m−1 αα−1 . (19)
From (19) follows our next result.
Proposition 3. In equilibrium, production Y ∗ is:
(i) increasing with the technology-cost ratio βγ ;
(ii) increasing with elite fighting advantage θ ;
(iii) decreasing with the effectiveness of group size m if and only if (1−α)θ < 1.
Proof. The results follow directly from the relevant first order conditions to (19).
Note that Proposition 3 does not cover the impact of productivity α on optimal produc-
tion. The relevant first order condition to (19) cannot be solved analytically and, instead,
we evaluated (19) numerically for a wide range of values for β , γ, θ , and m. This evalua-
tion reveals that, for most parameter combinations, production is not very sensitive to α;
the countervailing effects identified in the beginning of Section 3.4 cancel each other out.
There is one exception. When β is sufficiently large and m is sufficiently small, production
peaks for relatively large values of α. Example plots for different values of β and m are
provided in Figure 2. The increase in production for sufficiently large α and β is largely
driven by a peak in optimal effort (9), which is subsequently offset (for even larger α) by
the effect of increasing appropriation. Figure 2 also illustrates that for low values of α,
production may be decreasing in productivity α. This result should be seen in the context
of our production function which is qualitatively similar to a two-factor Cobb-Douglas
production function with exponent 1− α for labour and α for capital (see Section 2.3).
Doing so, the negative relation that we find is the conventional negative relation between
production and the exponent on capital provided that the capital-to-labour ratio is below
unity.
Substituting (12) for τ, (18) for ρ(e, w), (19) for Y (φ) and (9) for φ in the producers’
utility function (4), we obtain, after substantial simplification:
U∗ =

(1−α)γ
α
 γ
α2β
 1
α−1 
1+ (1−α) (1−α)θ 1m−1 1α−1 . (20)
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Figure 2: Equilibrium production Y ∗ as a function of α; example plots for γ = 1, θ = 2,
and different values of parameters β and m.
which is strictly positive under our parameter assumptions.
Based on (20), the effects of model parameters on producer welfare are summarized in
our next result.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium, producer utility U∗ is:
(i) increasing with the technology-cost ratio βγ ;
(ii) increasing with elite fighting advantage θ ;
(iii) decreasing with the effectiveness of group size m if and only if (1−α)θ < 1.
Proof. The results follow directly from the relevant first order conditions to (20).
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Figure 3: Equilibrium producer utility U∗ as a function of α; example plots for γ = 1, θ = 2,
and different values of parameters β and m.
Note that Proposition 4 does not cover the impact of productivity α on producer utility.
The relevant first order condition to (20) cannot be solved analytically and, instead, we
evaluated (20) numerically for a wide range of values for β , γ, θ , and m. This evaluation
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reveals that producer utility is hump-shaped in productivity α. Example plots for different
values of β and m are provided in Figure 3, which is directly comparable to Figure 2. This
figure illustrates the combination of direct and indirect effects of α on utility – as discussed in
the beginning of this section. Utility is low for both low α and, perhaps surprisingly, high α.
Maximal welfare levels are reached for intermediate values of α. The explanation for this
shape is largely found in the level of the appropriation rate and the return to investments
in effort. The appropriation rate equals the sum of taxation by elite and full rent extraction
by warlords. It can be expressed as ρ(e, w)(1−α) + (1−ρ(e, w)) = 1−αρ(e, w). From
this expression follows immediately that the appropriation rate tends to 1 for low α. Also,
by (18) we know that ρ(e∗, w∗) is decreasing in α, which implies increasing rent extraction
by warlords. Jointly, these effects make that the appropriation rate follows a U-shape with
minimal appropriation for intermediate levels of α.
All in all, producers are best off with intermediate levels of α, where their production
peaks through substantial investments in effort and the level of appropriation is still
relatively low. Combined with low m, the elite coalition is not very large (see Figure 1),
but is able to control the bulk of production. Lower levels of α would decrease the return
to investments in effort (higher tax and lower productivity), while higher levels of α would
lead to increased appropriation by warlords. Both effects are detrimental to producer
utility.
4 Extensions
In this section we consider two extension to our model, all of which relate to behaviour
within the elite coalition. So far, we have assumed a frictionless elite which stands in
sharp contrast to some of the historical examples that were referred to in the introduction.
Conflict within the elite coalition over the tax rent is likely and barriers to enter for new
members are to be expected. These are just two possible examples of frictions within the
elite coalition, but they are important ones. In Section 4.1 we assess the impact of conflict
over the tax rent by elite coalition members. In Section 4.2 we assess the implications of
entry barriers.
4.1 Within-coalition conflict
In the natural state, the elite emerges out of the pool of violence specialists, and cooperation
of violence specialists in the elite coalition is not self-evident. Given the outcome of Stages 1–
3, members of the elite coalition may engage in conflict over the tax rent. There are various
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ways to model such conflict and one could even argue that an appropriately designed
sharing rule or voting procedure could eliminate the incentive for rent-seeking within the
coalition. Yet, given the prominent position of violence in North et al. (2009) who also
stress the importance of conflict within the coalition, we follow their perspective here. We
proceed with a simple conflict model that we include as stage 4 of our model. This simple
set-up is sufficient to demonstrate the impact of the prospect of conflict on elite size.
We do so using a ratio-form CSF, similar to (1), except that it is not deterministic since
its outcome depends on deliberate choices by the elites to invest in conflict. Each elite
receives a share σi(s) of the tax rent, which depends on costly investments in conflict by
all elite-members, captured in the vector s = (si : i ∈ E):
σi(s) =
sni∑
j∈E snj
, (21)
with n ∈ (0, 1) being the effectiveness parameter for within-coalition conflict.
We update the payoff function 5 to elites:
pii = σi(s)τρ(e, w)Y (φ)− si ∀i ∈ E; (22)
Now, in Stage 1 violence specialists choose the most profitable occupation whilst taking
into account not only the optimal tax rate and production, but also the severity of conflict
within the coalition. Note that the combination of Stage 1 and Stage 4 resembles models of
sequential inter- and intra-group resource contest (Wärneryd, 1998; Esteban and Sákovics,
2003; Garfinkel, 2004; Inderst et al., 2007). We add to this the interaction between violence
specialists and producers.
Given outcomes of Stages 1–3, each elite-member chooses si to maximize his payoff as
given by (22):
∂ pii
∂ si
=
∂ σi(s)
∂ si
τρ(e, w)Y (φ)− 1 = 0 ∀i ∈ E. (23)
Note that we exclude the peaceful outcome where si = 0 for each agent. Such a peaceful
outcome cannot be an equilibrium to the conflict since one elite-member j could secure
the complete resource with a small investment in conflict s j > 0 (Garfinkel and Skaperdas,
2007). This opportunity would not be left unexploited in equilibrium, which is why we
exclude it from our analysis.
19
By (21) we have:
∂ σi(s)
∂ si
=
nsn−1i
∑
j∈E\{i} snj∑
j∈E snj
2 . (24)
With homogeneous violence specialists, such that si = s for each i ∈ E, we can simplify this
derivative to
∂ σi(s)
∂ si
=
n(e− 1)
se2
. (25)
Substituting this simplified derivative into (23) and solving for s, we obtain:
s =

e− 1
e2

nτρ(e, w)Y (φ). (26)
Note that we cannot proceed by substituting our previously found equilibrium values, since
these may be affected by the prospect of within-coalition conflict on Stage 1–3 decisions.
Specifically, this prospect affects the ratio of elites to warlords. It does not affect our result
on the optimal tax rate and it also does not affect our results on optimal production or
producer welfare, except through this ratio. To show the effect of within-coalition conflict
on ew , we equate (22) with (6) and we substitute (26) for si, to obtain:
1− n+ n/e
e

τρ(e, w) =

1
w
 
1−ρ(e, w). (27)
We can now rearrange terms to find the equilibrium ratio of elites to warlords, which is
independent from production Y :
e
w
=
(1− n+ n/e)τρ(e, w)
1−ρ(e, w) . (28)
We substitute (1) forρ(e, w) and (10) forτ in the equilibrium ratio (28). After simplification
we obtain the following ratio of elites to warlords as a function of exogenous parameters
and e:
e
w
=
 
(1− n+ n/e) (1−α)θ 11−m (29)
Comparing (28) with the related ratio in the standard version of our model (14), we
see that an additional term (1− n+ n/e) has entered the solution. This term is driven by
the anticipation of conflict in the fourth stage of the model (recall n is the effectiveness
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parameter for within-coalition conflict). For n→ 0, the effect of Stage 4 within-coalition
conflict on Stage 1 occupation choice vanishes; the ratio e
∗
w∗ converges to the ratio (14) of
the standard version of our model.
We continue to assess the effect of within-coalition conflict on ew by substituting |V | − e
for w in (29) and using implicit differentiation:
d
dn
e∗ = (e− e2)(|V | − e)2
n(|V | − e)2 + (1−m)(|V |e2)(1− n+ n/e) mm−1 ((1−α)θ ) 1m−1 < 0. (30)
All terms of (30) are positive, with the exception of the term (e − e2) in the numerator.
Hence, ddn e
∗ < 0. As a result, we find that the elite-warlord ratio e∗w∗ is decreasing with the
effectiveness of within-coalition conflict n. To illustrate this result we reproduce Figure 1
(which features no within-coalition fighting, hence n = 0), for the case where n = 1. Values
for e∗ and e∗w∗ in Figure 4 are computed by solving (29) numerically for n = 1 using the
Newton-Raphson method. Comparison of both figures shows that the limit case of the
model with n = 1 implies a substantially smaller elite coalition in equilibrium. Choosing
the elite occupation has become less attractive compared to the standard version of our
model, because of the prospect of within-coalition conflict. Obviously, this difference in
elite size is mitigated if we allow for the possibility that warlords also engage in a conflict
over their appropriative rents. Such warlord conflict would obviously decrease warlord
payoffs. The combined effect of warlord conflict and within-coalition conflict on elite size
will depend on the relative effectiveness of both conflicts. Note that we will need much of
the above derivations to introduce our results in the remainder of this section, which do
not depend on the existence or not of warlord conflict.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium size of the elite coalition e∗ and equilibrium elite-warlord ratio e∗w∗ as
a function of (1−α)θ for n = 1, |V |= 50, and different values of parameter m.
Our analysis up to here allows us to assess the impact of the number of contestants
on investments in conflict. A standard result from rent-seeking models (cf. Garfinkel and
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Skaperdas, 2007) is that an increase in the number of contestants decreases individual
investments in conflict. The intuition for this result is that in the presence of more com-
petitors the expected return to investments in conflict decreases. In the context of our
paper, this result would imply that the effect of an increase of e on s∗ is negative. In
conflict models with endogenous production, however, this result is reversed (Hirshleifer,
1995): an increase in the number of contestants increases individual investments in conflict.
The intuition is that, as the number of contestants increases, a smaller fraction of own
production can be retained and hence investments in conflict become more attractive. Our
next proposition shows that in the setting of our paper, where production is the domain of
a separate subset of producers and subject to interaction with violence specialists, both
results are combined. Specifically, an increase in the size of the elite coalition decreases
the level of appropriation which provides incentives to increase production. Increased
production, in turn, provides incentives to increase investments in conflict. This indirect
positive effect may offset the direct negative effect of e on s∗.
Proposition 5. In equilibrium, within-coalition investments in costly conflict s∗ are hump-
shaped in the size of the elite coalition e with a global maximum eˆ ∈ R : eˆ = 2−Z(eˆ)1−Z(eˆ) , where
Z(e) = m1−α
 
1−ρ(e, w).
Proof. Using (26), we first derive the first order condition ∂ s
∗
∂ e and solve for e which yields
the implicit function
e =
2(1−α)(θ em + wm)−mwm
(1−α)(θ em + wm)−mwm =
2− Z(e)
1− Z(e) , (31)
where Z(e) = m1−α
 
1−ρ(e, w). The second derivative of (26) with respect to e is rather
involved, so we confirmed concavity of ∂ s
∗
∂ e numerically. Given the domains of parameters
α and m and the function ρ(e, w), we have that Z(e)> 0. By (31), Z(e)> 0 implies that eˆ
is unbounded (e.g. consider cases with α and m such that Z(e) is close to unity).
To gain further insights into the effect of e on s∗, notice that e not only affects s∗ directly
but also through ρ(e, w) and Y (φ), where φ depends on e through ρ(e, w). To evaluate
these effects separately we take the total derivative of (26) to e (to reduce notational clutter
we write ρ(e, w) as ρ and Y (φ) as Y ):
ds∗
de
=
∂ s∗
∂ e
+
∂ s∗
∂ ρ
dρ
de
+
∂ s∗
∂ Y
∂ Y
∂ ρ
dρ
de
. (32)
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We find that these three effects are given by:
∂ s∗
∂ e
=

−

e− 2
e3

nτρY

; (33)
∂ s∗
∂ ρ
dρ
de
=

e− 1
e2

nτY

×
h
ρ (1−ρ)
m
e
i
; (34)
∂ s∗
∂ Y
∂ Y
∂ ρ
dρ
de
=

e− 1
e2

nτρ

×
h
ρ (1−ρ)
m
e
i
×
 α
1−α
 β
ρ

(1−τ)ραβ
γ
 α
1−α

. (35)
The direct effect of an increase of e on s∗ in (33) is negative (as long as e > 2), while both
indirect effects in (34) and (35) are positive for e > 1. An increase in e increases both the
share of production controlled by elites as well as (indirectly) the production level. Both of
these contribute to a higher tax rent, which makes fighting more attractive. Depending on
parameter values the positive or negative effect dominates as stated in the proposition.
4.2 Limiting access to the coalition
As a final extension, we assess whether the elite has an incentive to limit entry into the
coalition in order to avoid dilution of the tax rent. It seems reasonable to assume that
access into the coalition should require consent of the coalition members. In the literature
on coalition formation in games with externalities it is shown that the rules of coalition
formation may impact the coalition size. Specifically, requiring consent on membership –
called ‘exclusive membership’ in this literature – is one such rule. In a negative externality
game (as we have here), it normally implies smaller coalitions with higher payoffs per
member compared to ‘open membership’ (Yi, 1997).
Below we will illustrate that this result does not necessarily hold in our setting. We
do not impose a specific membership rule but rather compare the impact of (exogenous)
coalition size on elite payoffs, and subsequently compare these payoffs to those under
the (endogenous) equilibrium coalition size. Doing so, we find that elite payoffs are
not necessarily maximized at the endogenously determined coalition size (15). Instead,
members of the elite coalition may prefer an alternative elite size, which may be smaller
or larger, depending on parameter combinations in the model. This result is illustrated in
Figure 5 for different parameter combinations of α and m.
Figure 5 is based on the elite payoff function (15). Substitute (12) for τ and (10)
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Figure 5: Scaled individual payoffs (as given by the first RHS term of (36)) to members
of the elite coalition as a function of coalition size e for |V | = 50, α = 0.65, θ = 2, and
different values of parameter m. Circles indicate the (endogenous) equilibrium coalition
size for each m.
for Y (φ) and rearrange to obtain elite payoffs as a function of exogenous parameters and e:
pii =
 ρ(e, w) 11−α
e
 (1−α)β α2β
γ
 α
1−α
, (36)
Only the first RHS term of (36) depends on e and only this term was used to construct
Figure 5, the other terms being constant for given parameter values. The figure shows
individual elite payoffs as a function of elite coalition size e for three values of m. It
also displays, for each m, the equilibrium coalition size as the outcome of our model.
Clearly, elite-members could benefit from a change in the size of the elite coalition. For
m = 0.3, elite-members would benefit from a decrease in elite size. Conversely, for
m = 0.7, elite-members would benefit from an increase in elite size. For m = 0.5, they are
largely indifferent. Only when elites prefer a smaller coalition they would benefit from
implementing exclusive membership. When they prefer a larger coalition, then apparently
the equilibrium payoffs to warlords are sufficiently large to keep them out of the coalition;
no warlord has an incentive to switch and become a member. In such a setting, exclusive
membership would not affect coalition size.
The dependence of preferred elite size on m is due to the extent of diminishing marginal
returns to group formation for any m < 1. If m is low, group size becomes less relevant
for the share of production controlled by the elite than if m is large. Hence, for low m, a
smaller elite would increase the tax rent per elite-member. The opposite effect holds for
high m.
One question that may arise is what happens to the violence specialists that are rejected
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entrance in case of exclusive membership? Our model seems to allow for only one option,
they become warlords. In reality, however, such violence specialists may prefer to switch
and become a producer instead.8 In Section 1 we have argued that it is not possible for
producers to become violence specialists. Up to here, however, we have not discussed the
possibility of a switch in the opposite direction. A proper assessment of the incentives for
such a switch requires a comparison of payoffs to warlords and producers. Since, in our
model, production is represented only in aggregate terms without any reference to the
cardinality of the set of producers P, any such comparison would be ad-hoc. If the switch
from warlord to producer would be allowed, however, we can expect production to go
up (perhaps only marginally), as well as the share of production controlled by the elite
coalition. Both effects would increase payoffs to elite-members, amplifying the benefits of
exclusive membership.
5 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we provide economic intuition for the natural state by analysing the role
of organized large-scale violence and how it is contained. We highlight key mechanisms
underlying the natural state using insights from the economic literature on conflict and
appropriation. In general, we find large variations in the size of elite coalitions, appropria-
tion, production levels, and welfare across natural states, due to only minor variations in
exogenous model parameters. The characteristics of a given society at a given moment in
time will depend on the power balance between elite and warlords, all other factors equal.
Extending and formalizing the analysis by North et al. (2009), by explicitly taking into
account the incentive to violence specialists, this result implies that we can expect to find a
wide variety of outcomes within the class of limited access orders. Specifically, our results
show that unproductive societies tend to have large elite coalitions and high tax rates.
Only when the elite coalition is small (which occurs in societies with high productivity) but
still able to control a sizeable share of production, can societies prosper in a natural state.
Summarizing, both productivity and order are necessary conditions for prosperity. This
conclusion puts previous work by e.g. Bates et al. (2002) in perspective. Whereas they
stress the trade-off between ‘production’ and ‘protection’ in stateless societies, we find that
this trade-off is mitigated by the incentives of violence specialists to join forces in the elite
and jointly restrict violence.
This result illustrates the delicate balance between productivity and order (cf. Bates
8Alternatively they may start a second, competing, coalition. Co-existence of multiple coalitions was
analysed by a.o. Garfinkel (2004).
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et al., 2002). Dal Bó et al. (2015) analyse this balance as a pre-institutional process, arguing
that institutions play no role in explaining different outcomes across states. Their setting is
different (i.e. a monolithic incumbent, with certain defence and growth capabilities, owns
a productive asset and is challenged by a predatory competitor), but their conclusion is
similar to ours: both productivity and order are necessary conditions for prosperity. Like
Dal Bó et al. (2015), our results challenge the standard explanations for prosperity that
focus on the role of institutions (cf. Acemoglu et al., 2005) and human capital (Galor,
2005).
Our model is capable to answer, at least partially, why societies with extractive elites
emerge and persist. The traditional answer to this question is that the elite is better off
in an extractive and exclusive regime and powerful enough to maintain it (Sokoloff and
Engerman, 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). In contrast, North et al. (2009) start
from the assertion that violence is an endemic threat to the stability of societies, arguing
that a society with a small and extractive elite is a natural social order since it guarantees a
certain degree of order and stability, through a system of coercive rent extraction rather
than by destructive (and chaotic) appropriation. In contrast to most of the literature,
the elite coalition considered by North et al. (2009) and modelled in this paper, is not a
monolithic entity with absolute power. Instead, it consists of individuals who compete
with each other, each having specific but limited power. As a result, the elite coalition is
fragile, and the behaviour of individual elite-members is constrained by the threat of other
elite-members as well as warlords.
This perspective undermines theories that treat the elite as a powerful monolithic entity,
capable of reorganizing society. For instance, Grossman (2002) states that the ruler of
a society can induce the population to provide such a level of defence that all violence
and appropriation is deterred. In the natural state, however, no elite-member has such
power, and the decision-making of the coalition as a whole is much more complex. Also,
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 2008, 2012) stress that extractive hierarchies are persistent
because the monolithic elite will obstruct any change that might undermine its power. In
the natural state, however, the elite is not monolithic but elite-members and the rest of
society are constrained in their behaviour by the rigidity of the social order.
Several caveats are in place. First, we have modelled one-dimensional relations between
the tax rate, production, and within-coalition conflict. These relations are likely to be more
involved in practice. For instance, taxation and within-coalition conflict both require effort
from the patronage networks of the elite coalition. One consequence is that within-coalition
conflict could have detrimental effects on the tax rate that the coalition, as a group, can
enforce onto producers. Another consequence is that the decision on a tax rate could be the
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source of substantial conflict within the coalition. These, and other, complicating factors
are not considered here, since this would require a more explicit consideration of coalition
decision-making, where the size and composition of the coalition are endogenous to the
decision-making itself, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Second, the model developed in this paper is a stylized representation of a natural
state and, as a result, does not elaborate on how both elites and warlords exercise control
over producers and production. Our interpretation is that the size of the elite-controlled
production is simply a measure of the elite’s success in imposing order and stability. A more
realistic interpretation would be that elites and warlords each have a share of territory
under control, possibly tied to their patronage network. An implication of this alternative
interpretation is that one should take into account migration of producers and distinct
production decisions on territory controlled by elites and warlords. Taking the interpretation
one step further, one even has to consider competing coalitions in bordering regions.9 For
simplicity, we abstract from such considerations.
Third, we have ignored the changing nature of societies by treating society, its size, and
the distribution of capacities as constants. In future work we plan to address such dynamic
aspects.
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